This week, the Doc is asking the questions, and he went NFL-Draft-History Crazy. All my answers are in blue font. Let’s go!
QBs - *=star, s = starter, b = bust.
1998- Peyton Manning (*) , Ryan Leaf (b)
1999- Tim Couch (b), Donovan McNabb (*), Akili Smith (b), Duante Culpepper (s), Cade McNown (b)
2000- Chad Pennington (s)
2001- Michael Vick (s)
2002- David Carr (b), Joey Harrington (b), Patrick Ramsey (b)
2003- Carson Palmer (s), Byron Leftwich (b), Kyle Boller (b), Rex Grossman (b)
2004- Eli Manning (s/*), Phillip Rivers (s/*), Ben Roethlisberger (*), JP Losman (b)
2005- Alex Smith (b), Aaron Rodgers (s/*), Jason Campbell (s)
2006- Vince Young (s), Matt Leinart (b), Jay Cutler (s)
2007- Jamarcus Russell (b), Brady Quinn (b)
2008- Matt Ryan (s), Joe Flacco (s)
2009- Matthew Stafford (s), Mark Sanchez (s), Josh Freeman (s)
1998-2003:
6 starters or stars = worth the pick
10 busts = regret the pick
6/16 = 38%
2004-2009:
11 stars or starters = worth the pick
5 busts = regret the pick
12/17 = 71%
1. Given the expense of picking a franchise QB in the first round, why is it so difficult to evaluate a player’s talent?
There are huge differences in how football is played and in the general athleticism at each level, and this makes performance at one level sometimes unrelated to performance at the next level. Here’s what I mean: a very talented college athlete on a team that is athletically superior at all position compared to almost all their opponents (say Jamarcus Russell at LSU) can look great in college games without putting forth total effort off the field. He may not work hard in the weight room, he may be poor at film study and understanding of the offensive scheme, he may not take physical preparation seriously (partying the night before the game, eating or sleeping poorly, etc), but he’s talented enough (and his line and receivers are talented enough) that he still looks golden on gamedays. However, when he arrives in the pros (Jamarcus with the Raiders), the offensive scheme is 10 times more complicated, defensive fronts and coverages are 10 times harder to read and exploit, and everyone else on the field is as athletic as he is. All the advantages he had (that made him such a great prospect) are gone, and all his flaws (that were hidden from evaluators by his college situation) are now exposed. Nobody knew until they saw him at the NFL level, and he’s a bust.
2. What happened to QB evaluation and development that we jump from 38% to 71%? (without 2009 its still 9/14 for 64%)?
Some of this can, of course, be written off to chance. But I think the difference might actually be significant due to two things: changes in the evaluation process, and changes in the college game. Basically, teams spend more money and hire more experts to evaluate potential players than they did before. And, with the internet, all information has become more readily available, so that every aspect of the draftees life can be evaluated in excruciating detail (behavior in high school, family life, metrics on strength and speed and performance, video of workouts, etc, are all available on-line for the more famous first-round candidates). In college, the offenses at many schools have become much more sophisticated and NFL-like, providing the opportunity to evaluate a potential pro QB’s college performance as almost a preview of the professional abilities. This isn’t true at schools that run non-pro-style offenses (like Navy’s option offense), but it’s becoming more true in general.
Wide Receivers (Stars in BOLD)
1996- Keyshawn Johnson (#1), Terry Glenn (#7), Marvin Harrison (#19), Terrell Owens (#89)
1997- Ike Hillard (#7)
1998- Randy Moss (#21), Hines Ward (#92)
1999- Torry Holt (#6), David Boston (#8)
2000- Peter Warrick (#4), Plaxico Burress (#8), Travis Taylor (#10),
2001- David Terrell (#8), Koren Robinson (#9), Reggie Wayne (#30), Chad Johnson (#6), Steve Smith (#74)
2002- none
2003- Charles Rogers (#2), Andre Johnson (#3), Anquan Boldin (#54)
2004- Larry Fitzgerald (#3), Roy Williams (#7), Reggie Williams (#9)
2005- Braylon Edwards (#3), Troy Williamson (#7), Mike Williams (#10)
2006- Greg Jennings (#52), Brandon Marshall (#119), Marques Colston (#252)
2007- Calvin Johnson (#2), Ted Ginn Jr (#9)
2008- Desean Jackson (#49)
2009- Darius Heyward Bay (#7), Michael Crabtree (#10)
Since 1996 only 4/22 WR’s chosen in the top 10 became stars. Of the top 14 WR’s chosen since 1996 only 4 came in the top 10.
3. Why is it so difficult to predict the success of wide receivers?
This is similar to question one, in that the answer is simply that the college and pro games aren’t equivalent, and the quality of a player’s teammates and opponents can inflate or deflate his apparent performance at this level. Wide receivers are different from QB’s, though, in that brains and work ethic are more essential for a QB and raw athleticism is more essential for a receiver. Obviously, work ethic and brains help a receiver a lot (see Jerry Rice), and raw athleticism can make an otherwise lackluster QB a star (Mike Vick, Randall Cunningham, and Ben Rothlisberger). But overall, you know a headcase college QB won’t make it as a pro, while a headcase college WR is harder to judge and might be pretty good (Randy Moss got thrown out of FSU for smoking weed and was a problem-child at Marshall as well).
4. Why are so many wide receivers still chosen in the top 10?
You’re asking the wrong guy, because I’d always take the best O- or D-lineman, linebacker, DB, or running back before I’d take a QB or WR. I’m old-school, but I say defense and running game come first, then the passing game can emerge. Asshats like Matt Millen can draft receivers in the first round for 17 straight years and still have shitty teams, so I don’t understand it. Maybe it’s economics: do marquee receiver draft choices sell more season tickets prior to their rookie seasons? More jerseys from the team store? Seems to me winning would be smarter in the long run, but I think some owners are retarded in their priorities.
RB- Top Pick/Best Pick
1998- Curtis Enis (#5)/ Fred Taylor (#9)
1999- Edgerrin James (#4)/ Edgerrin James (#4)
2000- Jamal Lewis (#5)/ Shaun Alexander (#19)
2001- Ladanian Tomlonson (#5)/ Ladanian Tomlonson (#5)
2002- William Green (#16)/ Clinton Portis (#51)
2003- Willis McGahee (#23)/ Larry Johnson (#27)
2004- Steven Jackson (#24)/ Steven Jackson (#24
2005- Ronnie Brown (#2)/ Best? Who knows? Cedric Benson (#4), Frank Gore (#65), Marian Barber (#109), and Brandon Jacobs (#110) were all chosen.
2006- Reggie Bush (#2)/ Maurice Jones-Drew (#60)
2007- Adrian Peterson (#7)/ Adrian Peterson (#7)
2008- Darren McFadden (#4)/ Chris Johnson (#24)
2009- Knowshon Moreno (#12)/ LeSean McCoy (#54)
5. Overall star RBs are being chosen later and having less of an impact in the league. Is this due to changes in the rules that now favor on the passing game or something else?
The rule changes are part of it, but I think there are two other main reasons. First: longevity; the average superstar NFL RB can only handle a couple seasons of punishment before breaking down. These guys are bigger and faster than ever, but that means they also take more and bigger hits from the bigger and faster defenders. When a back gets more than 350 carries in a season, the next season almost always shows a huge dropoff, I guess because the human body can only stand so much abuse. The second reason is the emergence of the “running back by platoon.” Lots of teams now have multiple featured RBs who all see significant playing time. This may be related to the first reason (to reduce the number of carries for your star), or because teams use differently talented guys situationally. They may have one back for first and second down (the bruising runner), and one for passing situations (the smaller guy with better hands, who might also be smarter and better at blitz pickup and blocking). In all cases, it adds up to individual running backs becoming less valuable than they were a decade ago (with some exceptions, like Peterson or Chris Johnson), and thus getting drafted later.
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